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I. Introduction 
Among the many contributions that Judith Freedman has made to tax law and policy in 
the United Kingdom and around the world, one of the most sustained and significant involves the 
regulation and taxation of small business. Beginning with her 1994 Modern Law Review article 
on “Small Business and the Corporate Form”1 and continuing through numerous subsequent 
publications on the taxation of small business,2 Professor Freedman has consistently and 
persuasively argued for simplicity, neutrality, and coherence in the design of legal rules for the 
regulation and taxation of small businesses. 
In her Modern Law Review article, Professor Freedman challenged proposals for a 
separate legal form for small businesses in the United Kingdom,3 a theme to which she returned 
1 Judith Freedman, “Small Business and the Corporate Form: Burden or Privilege?” (1994) 57 The Modern 
Law Review 555-84 [hereafter “Small Business and the Corporate Form]. 
2 See, e.g., Judith Freedman, “Why Taxing the Micro-Business is Not Simple – A Cautionary Tale from the 
‘Old’ World” (2006), 2 Journal of the Australasian Tax Teachers Association 58-77 [hereafter “Taxing the 
Micro-Business”]; Claire Crawford and Judith Freedman, “Small Business Taxation” in Stuart Adam et. al., 
Dimensions of Tax Design: The Mirrlees Review, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 1028-99 
[hereafter “Small Business Taxation”]; and Abi Adams, Judith Freedman, and Jermias Prassi, “Rethinking 
legal taxonomies for the gig economy” (2018), 34:3 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 475-494 [hereafter 
“Legal Taxonomies”]. 
3 Freedman, “Small Business and the Corporate Form” supra note 1. 
2 
in the context of the taxation of small business.4 In the latter context, she has argued that the 
taxation of similar economic activities carried on through different legal forms is best addressed 
not by creating new classifications and complex anti-avoidance provisions to discourage tax-
motivated choices among different legal categories, but by structural changes that reduce or 
eliminate differences between the taxation of similar activities carried on through different legal 
forms in order to minimize tax-motivated incentives to choose among these legal forms.5 For this 
and other reasons, Professor Freedman has also questioned the rationale and effectiveness of 
special tax preferences for small business, particularly if these are delivered in the form of a 
reduced rate that is available to all small businesses, however defined.6  
This article reviews Professor Freedman’s contributions to tax law and policy regarding 
small business, and evaluates Canadian experience with the taxation of private companies and 
their shareholders in light of Professor Freedman’s work. Part II summarizes Professor 
Freedman’s main conclusions regarding the taxation of small business, addressing both the 
taxation of similar economic activities conducted through different legal forms and the rationale 
and effectiveness of special tax preferences for small business. Part III examines Canadian 
experience with the taxation of private companies and their shareholders, illustrating the ways 
in which Professor Freedman’s concerns about structural tax differentials and tax preferences for 
small business have played out in the Canadian context. Part IV concludes with a few 
4 See, e.g., Freedman and Crawford, “Small Business Taxation” supra note 2 at 1061-64 (rejecting the 
creation of new legal categories for the taxation of small business and concluding that “the best solution 
will be one that does not rely on defining sub-categories of company or types of shareholder”). 
5 See, e.g., Freedman, “Taxing the Micro-Business” supra note 2; Freedman and Crawford, “Small Business 
Taxation” supra note 2; and Adams, Freedman and Prassi, “Legal Taxonomies”” supra note 2. 
6 Freedman, “Taxing the Micro-Business” supra note 2; and Freedman and Crawford, “Small Business 
Taxation” supra note 2. 
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observations about how best to promote simplicity, neutrality and coherence in the taxation of 
small business. 
II. Judith Freedman on the Taxation of Small Business
Although sometimes viewed as relatively simple and limited in scope, structural issues
concerning the taxation of small, owner-managed businesses are, as Professor Freedman’s co-
authored contribution to the Mirrlees Review emphasizes, highly complex and pervasive in the 
design of the entire tax system.7 
Because individuals may conduct similar economic activities either as employees or self-
employed independent contractors, and small businesses may be carried on in unincorporated 
form or through a corporate entity, the existence of these different legal categories poses key 
questions about the rationale (if any) for differences in the tax treatment of income derived 
through these different legal forms, as well as important issues regarding the effects of any tax 
differentials on economic behaviour. As a result, while many individuals have no choice other 
than to provide their services as employees, and incorporation is often commercially necessary 
for larger businesses wishing to raise external capital, the choice among employment, self-
employment and incorporation is, as Professor Freedman observes, uniquely relevant for 
“owner-managed businesses at the smallest end of the business sector.”8 
In addition, deliberate use of the tax system to encourage (or compensate) small business 
through tax preferences raises further questions about the rationales, if any, for such 
encouragement (or compensation), the effectiveness of specific tax preferences to address these 
7 Freedman and Crawford, “Small Business Taxation” supra note 2 at 1032. 
8 Ibid. at 1029. 
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rationales, and the behavioural impact of these preferences. The following sections summarize 
Professor Freedman’s conclusions on each of these issues, beginning with the taxation of similar 
economic activities conducted through different legal categories before turning to the rationale 
and effectiveness of special tax preferences for small business. 
(1)  Legal Categories, Tax Differentials, and Policy Responses 
In the United Kingdom, as in many other countries including Canada, tax rules create key 
tax differentials between the taxation of employees and self-employed independent contractors 
on the one hand, and between unincorporated businesses and incorporated businesses on the 
other. 
Employees, for example, are generally highly constrained in their ability to deduct 
expenses, while deductions for self-employed taxpayers are much more generous.9 In the United 
Kingdom, for example, employees must satisfy a strict test of the expense being incurred “wholly, 
exclusively and necessarily in the performance of the duties of employment”,10 while self-
employed taxpayers may deduct expenses incurred “wholly, exclusively and necessarily for the 
purposes of the trade.”11 In Canada, employees are allowed only those deductions that are 
expressly allowed under the Income Tax Act,12 while self-employed taxpayers may deduct 
“ordinary and well-accepted” expenses in computing business profits,13 subject to a specific 
9 See, e.g., Freedman and Crawford, “Small Business Taxation” supra note 2 at 1044-45. 
S Section 336 of the Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2005 (ITEPA). 
11 In the UK, see s. 34 of the Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act (ITTOIA), 2005. 
12 Income Tax Ac, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-1 (as amended), s. 8(2) [hereafter “ITA”]. 
13 Ibid., s. 9(1) defines a taxpayer’s income from a business as the taxpayer’s “profit” from that business. 
Canadian courts have held that this concept authorizes the deduction of business expenses the deduction 
of which is consistent with “ordinary principles of commercial trading” and “well-accepted business 
practices”. See, e.g., Imperial Oil Limited, [1947] C.T.C. 353, (1947) 3 D.T.C. 1090 (Ex. Ct.); and The Royal 
Trust Company v. Minister of National Revenue, [1957] C.T.C. 32, 57 D.T.C. 1055 (Ex. Ct.). 
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statutory requirement that the expense is incurred “for the purpose of gaining or producing 
income from the business”.14 In addition to this important tax differential, income paid to 
employees is typically subject to social insurance contributions and/or payroll taxes, which are 
generally less substantial or not imposed on income paid to self-employed taxpayers. As well, 
while income paid to employees is generally subject to withholding at source, this is typically not 
the case for income paid to self-employed taxpayers. 
As a result, as Professor Freedman has explained, tax law offers a number of incentives 
to treat those who supply services to an engager’s business as self-employed taxpayers rather 
than employees.15 Since the boundary between these two legal categories depends on detailed 
assessments of the facts of the particular relationship,16 it is not surprising that this 
determination is among the most disputed tax issues.17 It is also not surprising that these tax 
differentials have contributed to a growing shift toward self-employment over the last two 
decades, particularly with the rise of the so-called “gig economy”.18 
Tax differentials between unincorporated businesses and incorporated businesses are 
even greater than those between employees and self-employed taxpayers, due to differences in 
the rates at which income is subject to tax in the hands of individuals and corporations and the 
14 ITA, supra note 12, s. 18(1)(a). 
15 Freedman, “Taxing the Micro-Business” supra note 2 at 480. 
16 Freedman and Crawford, “Small Business Taxation” supra note 2 at 1044 (referring to “characteristics 
or ‘badges’ of employment status”). In Canada, for example, see Wiebe Door Services Ltd. v. Minister of 
National Revenue, [1986] 2 C.T.C. 200, 87 D.T.C. 5025 (F.C.A.), which established a test that looks to “the 
total relationship” between the parties, considering traditional factors like control, as well as economic 
factors such as chance of profit and ownership of tools, and the extent to which the taxpayer is integrated 
into the engager’s business when viewed from the perspective the taxpayer. 
17 See the cases discussed in David G. Duff, et. al., Canadian Income Tax Law, (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2018) 
at 211-218. 
18 Adams, Freedman and Prassi, “Legal Taxonomies”” supra note 4. 
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ease with which corporate income facilitates the conversion of what would otherwise be higher-
taxed labour income into lower-taxed income from capital. 
Although corporate income tax rates in many countries were once comparable to the 
highest marginal rate of income tax for individuals, this is no longer the case as globalization and 
capital mobility have placed downward pressure on corporate income tax rates at the same time 
as growing economic inequalities have created political pressure to increase top marginal rates 
of personal income tax. In Canada, for example, the average combined federal and provincial tax 
rate on corporate income not that does not qualify for a special “small business” rate was almost 
45 percent in 2000, which was only slightly less than the average combined federal and provincial 
top personal income tax rate at the time.19 Since then, the average combined federal and 
provincial tax rate on corporate income not eligible for the small business rate has fallen to 26.8 
percent, while the average top marginal federal and provincial income tax rate for individuals has 
increased to 51.6 percent.20 Similarly in the United Kingdom, while the general corporate tax rate 
fell from 35 percent in 2000 to 19 percent in 2017, the top marginal personal tax rate increased 
from 40 percent to 45 percent over this period. Although the ultimate impact of these tax 
differentials depends on the taxation of corporate distributions and the taxation of gains on the 
sale or liquidation of corporate shares, dividends or gains may also be subject to tax at reduced 
rates, and the ability to defer the distribution of corporate income or the sale or liquidation of 
corporate shares means that lower corporate tax rates can yield both permanent and temporary 
tax reductions. 
19 See, e.g., Department of Finance Canada, Tax Planning Using Private Corporations (Ottawa; Department 
of Finance, 2017) at 12, Chart 5. 
20 Ibid. 
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 In addition to the advantage of a lower income tax rate, incorporation also allows owner-
managers to convert what would otherwise be income from labour into income from capital that 
may be distributed in the form of dividends or realized in the form of gains on the sale or 
liquidation of corporate shares.21 Since dividends or capital gains may be subject to tax at lower 
rates than those applicable to business or employment income,22 and are generally not subject 
to social insurance contributions and/or payroll taxes,23 this ability to convert labour income into 
capital income creates an additional tax advantage for small businesses to incorporate.24 As well, 
the conversion of labour income into capital income makes it much easier to split income with 
non-arm’s length persons such as spouses and children who acquire shares in a corporation, 
creating yet another potential tax benefit to incorporation.25 
Just as the tax differentials between employees and self-employed taxpayers create 
incentives for workers to become self-employed, so also do the tax differentials between 
unincorporated businesses and incorporated businesses create powerful incentives for small 
owner-managed businesses to incorporate. As a result, it is not surprising the number of 
corporations increased dramatically in the United Kingdom after the introduction of a nil rate for 
small companies in 2000,26 and that the number of small business corporations in Canada 
21 Freedman and Crawford, “Small Business Taxation” supra note 2 at 1049. 
22 This is particularly the case with capital gains, which are subject to entrepreneur’s relief in the UK, and 
also favoured in Canada both by taxing only half the gain and through a “lifetime capital gains deduction” 
that currently exempts over $860,000 of gains realized on the disposition of “qualified small business 
corporation shares” over the course of a taxpayer’s lifetime. See the discussion at infra, text 
accompanying notes 140-158. 
23 In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, recent changes to dividend taxation appear to have been 
designed to address this differential to some extent. See Glen Loutzenhiser, “Where next for small 
company tax reform in the UK?” [2016] British Tax Review 674-99.  
24 Freedman and Crawford, “Small Business Taxation” supra note 2 at 1049. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. at 1054-56. 
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increased by 50 percent from 2001 to 2014 after the Supreme Court of Canada sanctioned a 
previously uncertain income-splitting arrangement involving the payment of discretionary 
dividends by private companies.27 Nor is it surprising that most of these incorporations have 
involved owner-managed small businesses with few or no employees,28 since it is precisely these 
kinds of businesses that are apt to be most responsive to tax differentials between these different 
legal categories. 
In response to this tax-motivated behaviour, governments often enact complex statutory 
rules, which as Professor Freedman’s co-authored contribution to the Mirrlees Review 
emphasizes, “attempt, often unsuccessfully, to confine the tax advantages to a subcategory.”29 
Alternatively or additionally, revenue authorities may rely on specific or general anti-avoidance 
rules to challenge tax-motivated arrangements to obtain tax benefits available through specific 
legal categories. 
27 Department of Finance Canada, Tax Planning Using Private Corporations, supra note 19 at 11, Chart 4. 
The case at issue, and the limited legislative response to the decision are discussed later in this article at 
infra, text accompanying notes 39-42 and 159-167. Although the average combined federal and provincial 
rate of tax on small business income decreased from 20 percent to 14.4 percent during this period, the 
opportunity to split income was much more significant, particularly when several provincial governments 
allowed non-medical practitioners to hold shares in professional corporations, thereby effectively 
offloading part of the cost of negotiating with medical professional on the federal treasury. See also 
Michael Wolfson and Scott Legree, “Policy Forum: Private Companies, Professionals and Income-Splitting 
– Recent Canadian Experience” (2015), 63:3 Canadian Tax Journal 717-37.
28 For evidence from the UK, see Freedman and Crawford, “Small Business Taxation” supra note 3 at 1056-
58, reporting that the number of companies with no employees increased by approximately 50 percent 
from 2000 to 2006, while those with 1 to 9 employees increased by less than 40 percent and those with 
10 or more employees increased by less than 20 percent. For evidence from Canada, see Department of 
Finance Canada, Tax Planning Using Private Corporations, supra note 19 at 11, reporting that the number 
of incorporated self-employed individuals doubled between 2000 and 2016 and the number of 
professional services corporations tripled during this period. 
29 Freedman and Crawford, “Small Business Taxation” supra note 2 at 1061. 
9 
In the United Kingdom, for example, the introduction of a nil tax rate on small companies 
was accompanied by the enactment of personal service company (PSC) rules that are designed 
to discourage employees from incorporating by subjecting the earnings of these companies to 
income tax and National Insurance Contributions (NICs) as if the income had been earned directly 
by the individual performing services.30 Subsequent rules aimed to deny the benefit of the nil 
rate to profits that were not reinvested in the business by applying an additional tax on corporate 
distributions paid out of profits that were taxed at a rate lower than the regular small company 
rate.31 Although the latter rules were repealed along with the nil rate in 2006, the PSC rules 
remain. 
Similarly in Canada, where a “small business deduction” reduces the rate of tax on the 
“active business income” of “Canadian-controlled private corporations”,32 access to this low rate 
is precluded for personal services businesses (PSBs) in which an “incorporated employee” 
performs services on behalf of the corporation.33 Although the Canadian rules do not look 
through the corporation to tax this income as if it were earned directly by the individual 
performing the services, other provisions deny the deduction of most expenses incurred by a PSB 
other than remuneration and benefits paid to the “incorporated employee”34 and subject income 
30 Ibid. at 1050. 
31 Freedman, “Taxing the Micro-Business” supra note 2 at 69; and Susan Ball, “The Non-Corporate 
Distribution Rate – Section 28 and Schedule 3” [2004] British Tax Review 459. 
32 ITA, supra note 12, s. 125. See the discussion at infra, text accompanying notes 99-138. 
33 Ibid., s. 125(7) “personal services business”. 
34 Ibid., s. 18(1)(p). 
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that is received by the PSB to a rate of federal income tax equal to the highest federal marginal 
tax rate imposed on individuals.35 
In order to challenge income-splitting arrangements involving private corporations, the 
United Kingdom has generally relied on anti-avoidance rules rather than detailed statutory 
provisions, invoking the “settlements provisions” in Jones v. Garnett.36 While the taxpayer 
prevailed at the Court of Appeal and at the House of Lords, the reasons for these judicial decisions 
differed sharply, leaving some uncertainty as to precisely when these provisions might apply – as 
borne out at least one subsequent decision by a Special Commissioner.37 Although the Labour 
Government of the day introduced draft legislation to address family income-splitting 
arrangements, implementation of this legislation was postponed and the legislation was 
eventually withdrawn.38 
In Canada, on the other hand, where a 1998 decision by the Supreme Court of Canada 
sanctioned a previously uncertain income-splitting arrangement involving the payment of 
discretionary dividends by private companies,39 the government of the day was quick to enact a 
35 This is accomplished by a number of provisions, beginning with the general corporate rate of 38 percent 
in ibid., s. 123(1), a 10 percent deduction for income earned in a province under ibid., s. 124(1), and an 
additional tax of 5 percent under ibid., s. 123.5. Although provincial corporate and individual rate rates 
vary, this equivalence generally also applies when provincial income taxes are taken into account. 
36 Glen Loutzenhiser, “Tax Avoidance, Private Companies and the Family” (2013), 72(1) Cambridge Law 
Journal 35-49. 
37 Buck v. Revenue & Customs Commissioners, [2009] S.T.C. (S.C.D.) 6, discussed in ibid. at 43. 
38 Loutzenhiser, “Tax Avoidance, Private Companies and the Family” supra note 36 at 42. 
39 Neuman v. The Queen, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 770, [1998] 3 C.T.C. 177, 98 D.T.C. 6297 (S.C.C.), relying on the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s prior decision in McClurg v. The Queen, [1990] 1 S.C.R., [1991] 1 C.T.C. 169, 91 
D.T.C. 5001 (S.C.C.) to conclude that the payment of discretionary dividends on a class of shares held by 
the taxpayer’s spouse was not subject to the attribution rule in ITA, supra note 12, s. 56(2). For a critical 
review of the decision, see David G. Duff, “Neuman and Beyond: Income Splitting, Tax Avoidance, and 
Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court of Canada” (1999), 32 Canadian Business Law Journal 345-
383. 
11 
legislative response in the form of a separate “tax on split income” (TOSI) which subjected most 
private company dividends received by individuals under the age of 18 to tax at the top marginal 
rate of personal income tax.40 Since this provision applied only to individuals under the age of 18, 
however, income-splitting through private corporations continued to be available for spouses 
and adult children, contributing to a 50 percent rate of growth in the number of Canadian-
controlled private corporations over the following 15 years, with much higher rates of growth for 
self-employed individuals and professional corporations.41 The government returned to the issue 
in 2017, proposing to extend the TOSI rules to adult individuals receiving dividends from and 
capital gains from the disposition of shares of private companies over which a connected 
individual exercises significant influence, unless these amounts are reasonable in the 
circumstances taking into account contributions of labour and capital.42 After considerable 
controversy, a substantially revised and considerably more complex version of these rules was 
enacted effective for the 2018 taxation year. 
Reflecting her consistent emphasis on simplicity and neutrality in tax rules, Professor 
Freedman has been sharply critical of these responses to differences in the tax treatment of 
similar economic activities carried on through different legal forms. Of the PSC rules, for example, 
she has written that they are “complex and uncertain” in their application, relying on the same 
fact-based tests that are used to distinguish employees from self-employed taxpayers, and that 
they impose “a cost and burden on a greater number of business owners than are ultimately 
40 ITA, supra note 12, s. 120.4. In order to prevent share sales designed to avoid the provision, it was 
subsequently extended to capital gains from the sale of private company shares to non-arm’s length 
persons. 
41 Department of Finance Canada, Tax Planning Using Private Corporations, supra note 19 at 11. 
42 Ibid. at 23-28. 
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subject to the provisions, because many people need to seek advice.”43 Similar criticisms might 
be levied on the PSB rules in the Canadian ITA, which also rely on the same fact-based 
determinations that are used to distinguish employees from self-employed taxpayers.44 
Professor Freedman has also questioned the use of anti-avoidance provisions to challenge 
income-splitting arrangements involving private corporations, arguing that this approach “has 
created serious uncertainty for many small businesses and a general sense of persecution”, and 
denouncing this response as “a lazy approach to policy making because the problem is perceived 
as being too hard to tackle with specific and structural legislation.”45 At the same time, she has 
also criticized the proposed legislative response to Jones v. Garnett, maintaining that these 
provisions were “complex and fact dependent, leading to justified criticisms that [they] would be 
heavy in compliance and administrative costs and yet would probably raise little revenue.”46 Here 
too, similar criticisms may be directed at Canada’s TOSI rules, which are extraordinarily complex 
and also dependent on fact-based determinations, notwithstanding the existence of specific safe 
harbours that inevitably add to the complexity. 
Rejecting these limited legislative and judicial responses to the existence of tax-
differentials among similar economic activities carried on through different legal forms, Professor 
43 Freedman, “Taxing the Micro-Business” supra note 2 at 72, adding that: “This is a source of a great deal 
of angst for business people, which causes considerable annoyance beyond those in fact subject to the 
legislation. It also creates a great deal of work for professional advisors, but work which they would 
perhaps prefer not to have as it is not especially productive or lucrative.” See also Loutzenhiser, “Tax 
Avoidance, Private Companies and the Family” supra note 36 at 43-44. 
44 See the definition of “personal services business” in ITA, supra note 12, s. 125(7), which turns on 
whether the incorporated employee “would reasonably be regarded as an officer or employee of the 
person or partnership to whom or to which the services were provided but for the existence of the 
corporation”. 
45 Freedman, “Taxing the Micro-Business” supra note 2 at 74, 
46 Freedman and Crawford, “Small Business Taxation” supra note 2 at 1053. 
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Freedman has instead favoured structural changes that reduce or eliminate these tax 
differentials themselves – arguing that the optimal policy response to tax-motivated responses 
to these tax differentials is “to align the tax payable by each group as far as possible, such that 
the boundaries matter less or, if possible, not at all, for tax purposes.”47 For this reason, she has 
argued that “if it is desired to tax income from incorporated firms as labour income, then it would 
be preferable to achieve this through structural changes to the tax system” instead of through 
complicated provisions like the PSC rules that aim to re-characterize corporate income as 
employment income.48 For the same reason, she has also argued that responses to the use of 
private corporations to split income with related individuals should be addressed “in a holistic 
way, looking at the rules on family taxation, small business taxation and capital transfers between 
spouses” as a whole,49 recognizing that the “fundamental issue” involves the re-characterization 
of income from labour as income from capital.50 In principle, therefore, her preferred approach 
would be that “[i]ndividuals who are identical in every way except their legal form should not 
face radically divergent tax incentives.”51 For this reason, her co-authored contribution to the 
Mirrlees Review suggests that a possible solution to the existence of tax differentials for small 
businesses carried on through different legal forms “might be to treat employees through to 
companies across the whole small business spectrum in exactly the same way for tax purposes, 
taxing them on the same receipts at exactly the same rate.”52  
47 Adams, Freedman and Prassi, “Legal Taxonomies”” supra note 2 at 486. 
48 Freedman and Crawford, “Small Business Taxation” supra note 2 at 1052. 
49 Freedman, “Taxing the Micro-Business” supra note 2 at 74. 
50 Freedman and Crawford, “Small Business Taxation” supra note 2 at 1054. 
51 Adams, Freedman and Prassi, “Legal Taxonomies”” supra note 2 at 484. 
52 Freedman and Crawford, “Small Business Taxation” supra note 2 at 1032. 
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Notwithstanding this conceptual ideal, however, Professor Freedman has recognized that 
practical and theoretical considerations may justify some tax differentials for income obtained 
through different legal forms. Explaining that receipts “vary in nature” and that ”an employee’s 
wage cannot be equated with the receipts of a business”, for example, Professor Freedman’s co-
authored contribution to the Mirrlees Review suggests that a taxpayer’s income from 
employment must be computed differently from that of a self-employed taxpayer, for whom the 
computation of business income requires “the application of rules from which it is possible to 
derive a profit figure.”53 As well, observing that globalization and capital mobility have created 
downward pressure on corporate income tax rates,54 Professor Freedman also acknowledges the 
enduring presence of tax differentials between labour income and capital income, suggesting 
however that these differentials are best addressed by structural reforms that prevent the 
conversion of labour income into capital income.55 
As a result, although Professor Freedman seems to suggest that rules for computing the 
income of employees and self-employed taxpayers might reasonably differentiate among 
allowable deductions,56 she maintains that tax differentials on income derived through these 
different legal forms should be reduced by aligning NICs on income earned by employees and 
self-employed taxpayers and requiring tax and NIC contributions to be deducted on payments to 
self-employed taxpayers.57 Similarly for income derived through incorporated businesses, 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. at 1064. 
55 Ibid. at 1033. 
56 Although Professor Freedman is not clear on this point, it appears to be a reasonable inference from 
the suggestion in her co-authored contribution to the Mirrlees Review that “an employee’s wage cannot 
be equated with the receipts of a business.” Ibid. at 1032. 
57 Adams, Freedman and Prassi, “Legal Taxonomies”” supra note 2 at 493. 
15 
Professor Freedman has suggested that tax differentials are best addressed by aligning effective 
tax rates “after taking into account capital investment”58 by distinguishing labour income from 
capital income and subjecting the former to NICs and taxation at the higher rates applicable to 
individuals. To this end, her co-authored contribution to the Mirrleess Review proposes that the 
United Kingdom should adopt a dual income tax similar to that in the Nordic countries, including 
an allowance for corporate equity (ACE) in computing corporate income that would exclude the 
normal rate of return on corporate assets while taxing other corporate income at higher rates 
that apply to individuals.59 Correspondingly, unincorporated businesses would pay the capital 
income tax rate on an imputed return on business assets, with the remainder taxable at higher 
rates of tax applicable to labour income.60 Although this approach would not eliminate the ability 
of owner-managers to split their income with non-arm’s length persons, it would reduce the 
resulting tax advantages by taxing income other than the normal return to capital at the labour 
income tax rate.61 Similar proposals have been made for a dual income tax in Canada,62 but these 
recommendations have yet to be adopted in the Canada or the United Kingdom. 
(2) Tax Preferences for Small Business 
Consistent with these proposals for structural changes to reduce or eliminate tax 
differentials for similar economic activities carried on through different legal forms, Professor 
Freedman has also rejected special tax preferences for small business – particularly if these are 
58 Freedman and Crawford, “Small Business Taxation” supra note 2 at 1030. 
59 Ibid. at 1067. 
60 Ibid. at 1068. 
61 Ibid. at 1069. 
62 See, e.g., Kevin Milligan, Tax Policy for a New Era: Promoting Economic Growth and Fairness, (Toronto: 
C.D. Howe Institute, 2014). 
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delivered in the form of reduced rates such as the short-lived nil rate in the United Kingdom or 
the small company rate that was eliminated in 2015. Although recognizing that market failures 
may justify tax incentives for certain kinds of behaviour, such as research and development, and 
that some such incentives might reasonably differentiate between small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) and larger corporations,63 Professor Freedman has challenged each of the 
three leading arguments in favour of broad-based tax preferences for small businesses: first, that 
they are necessary to address structural challenges that small enterprises experience obtaining 
finance; second, that they compensate for structural issues in being small such as the regressive 
impact of compliance burdens and an inability to set off losses against profits; and more generally 
that small businesses are important engines of economic growth and job creation, which itself 
justifies support through the tax system.64 
Beginning with the last of these arguments, there is little evidence to support the claim 
that small business is crucial to economic growth or job creation. Although studies suggest that 
incorporated businesses are more likely to grow than unincorporated businesses,65 it is unclear 
whether incorporation is a cause or effect of growth, since businesses that wish to grow are likely 
to incorporate at some point,66 while other businesses that do not wish to grow may incorporate 
primarily for tax reasons.67 Nor are all small businesses effective vehicles for job creation, since 
63 Freedman and Crawford, “Small Business Taxation” supra note 2 at 1078-80, noting that smaller 
enterprises may have fewer opportunities to balance costs against profits from other activities. For this 
reason, Canadian tax assistance for research and development carried on by private companies is 
generally provided in the form of refundable tax credits. ITA, supra note 12, s. 127(10) and 127.1(1). 
64 Ibid. at 1074. 
65 See, e.g., David J. Story, Understanding the Small Business Sector, (Abingdon: Routledge, 1994) at 140. 
66 Freedman, “Taxing the Micro-Business” supra note 2 at 64. 
67 Ibid., characterizing many of these small businesses as “life-style businesses” that are carried on for 
non-tax reasons, but incorporated for tax reasons.   
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many closely-held corporations have no employees and only a minority of small enterprises 
create jobs.68 Where small businesses do create jobs, moreover, these jobs may not endure, as 
studies suggest that only a small percentage of SMEs last for more than ten years.69 As a result, 
Professor Freedman concludes, tax preferences that are conferred on small businesses in order 
to encourage growth and job creation are apt to be poorly targeted and ineffective, encouraging 
the tax-motivated incorporation of small businesses more than the economic outcomes that 
these tax preferences are intended to promote.70 
Nor is there strong evidence of any pressing market failure in the financing of SMEs. 
Although it is reasonable to conclude that many new businesses find it more difficult to raise 
capital than established enterprises,71 Professor Freedman rightly explains that an effective 
policy response to this market failure would target newly-established businesses, not small 
businesses as a whole, many of which may not wish to expand and have little or no need for 
finance.72 Indeed, by withdrawing tax benefits as new enterprises grow, tax preferences targeted 
at small businesses may create a barrier to this growth instead of removing one.73 According to 
one study, for example, by encouraging economic activity through SMEs rather than larger 
corporations, Canada’s small business deduction may contribute to lower productivity in Canada 
than in other developed countries.74 As a result, instead of enhancing economic efficiency by 
68 Freedman and Crawford, “Small Business Taxation” supra note 2 at 1038 and 1075. 
69 Kenneth Hendricks, Raphael Amit and Diana Whistler, Business Taxation of Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises in Canada, Working Paper 97-11, Prepared for the Technical Committee on Business Taxation 
(October 1997) at 1, reporting that only 20 percent of SMEs existed ten years later. 
70 Freedman, “Taxing the Micro-Business” supra note 2 at 64. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Freedman and Crawford, “Small Business Taxation” supra note 2 at 1078. 
73 Ibid. at 1080. 
74 Duanjie Chen and Jack M. Mintz, “Small Business Taxation: Revamping Incentives to Encourage Growth” 
(2011), 4:7 School of Public Policy Research Papers 1-29 (University of Calgary School of Public Policy). 
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counteracting a market failure, tax preferences for small businesses may actually impede 
economic efficiency.75 
In contrast to a lack of evidence to support arguments that small business is essential to 
economic growth and job creation and systematically disadvantaged in raising finance, there is 
considerable evidence indicating that small businesses experience a disproportionate burden to 
comply with tax rules and other regulatory obligations by virtue of their size alone.76 It is also 
reasonable to conclude that SMEs may be more constrained than larger enterprises in their 
ability to set off losses against profits. As Professor Freedman’s co-authored contribution to the 
Mirrlees Review notes, however, this constraint is more likely to apply to new enterprises than 
more established enterprises, and is probably best addressed by permitting some pass-through 
treatment for corporate losses, particularly new corporations, than by a broader tax preference 
for all small businesses in the form of a reduced rate of tax.77 
Although disproportionate compliance costs may justify some relief provisions, such as 
reduced reporting requirements or income thresholds for VAT registration,78 it is also not obvious 
that this structural disadvantage is best addressed by a reduced rate of income tax for all small 
businesses. On the contrary, Professor Freedman cautions, since a low corporate tax rate for 
small business is apt to be accompanied by detailed anti-avoidance rules to prevent abuse, a tax 
75 Freedman, “Taxing the Micro-Business” supra note 2 at 61, concluding that tax preferences for small 
businesses “may distort the market in unintended ways by, for example, resulting in the allocation of 
resources to small firms in circumstances where larger firms could be used more efficiently.” 
76 See, e.g., Chris Evans, Ann Hansford, John Hasseldine Philip Lignier, Sharon Smulders and Francois 
Vaillancourt, “Small business and tax compliance costs: A cross-country study of managerial benefits and 
tax concessions” (2014) 12:2 eJournal of Tax Research 453-82. 
77 Freedman and Crawford, “Small Business Taxation” supra note 2 at 1084. 
78 Ibid. at 1081-82. 
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preference along these lines can add to the complexity of the tax system, thereby increasing 
compliance burdens for enterprises wishing to benefit from the preference.79 In addition, 
complexity and compliance costs are often compounded by the fact that these anti-avoidance 
rules are often revised and extended to address novel forms of abuse.80 
In the United Kingdom, for example, where a nil rate of tax on the first £10,000 of 
corporate income was introduced in 2002, complicated anti-avoidance rules were subsequently 
enacted in order to increase the corporate tax rate on distributions paid out of profits taxed at 
less than the general corporate tax rates, thereby negating the advantage of the nil rate on these 
profits.81 Likewise in Canada, where a small business deduction reduces the rate of corporate tax 
on the first $500,000 of active business income of a Canadian-controlled private corporation, 
numerous and increasingly complicated anti-avoidance rules aim to prevent the multiplication of 
this deduction through “associated corporations” and other arrangements.82  It is ironic, 
therefore, that those defending the Canadian deduction often point to the costs that businesses 
bear in order to comply with tax rules as a central rationale for the preservation of a tax 
preference that greatly contributes to these compliance costs.83  
79 Ibid. at 1082-83, characterizing this outcome as a form of “complex deregulation”.  
80 Freedman, “Taxing the Micro-Business” supra note 2 at 65-67, explaining that compliance and 
administrative costs are increased not only by the complexity of legal rules, but by frequent changes in 
legal rules. 
81 Ibid. at 69, citing one commentator who described these anti-avoidance provisions as “bordering on the 
surreal”.  
82 See, e.g., the associated corporation rules in ITA, supra note 12, s. 256, and recently-enacted rules 
denying the small business deduction for income from the provision of services or property to a private 
corporation where the corporation, one of its shareholders or a person who does not deal at arm’s length 
with the corporation or one of its shareholders holds a direct or indirect interest in the private corporation 
to which the services or property are provided. Ibid., s. 125(1)(a) and 125(7) “specified corporate income” 
and “specified partnership income”. 
83 See, e.g., Ted Mallet, “Policy Forum: Mountains and Molehills – Effects of the Small Business Deduction” 
(2015), 63:3 Canadian Tax Journal 691-704. 
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In addition to the complexity associated with a low corporate tax rate for small business, 
moreover, experience suggests that this kind of tax preference can be extremely costly in terms 
of foregone revenues. In the United Kingdom, which offered a reduced corporate tax rate for 
small companies until 2015, the cost of this tax preference was estimated at £1.585 billion in 
2013-14.84 In Canada, the annual cost of the small business deduction in terms of foregone 
federal income tax revenue was estimated at $3.75 billion in 2016, an amount that is projected 
to increase to $5.585 billion in 2019 – making it the second most costly corporate tax expenditure 
after the partial taxation of capital gains.85 
Finally, studies indicate that a low corporate tax rate for small business provides the most 
benefit to high-income shareholders and family members who are able to obtain the greatest 
advantage from the deferral and income-splitting opportunities that are available when income 
is derived through private corporations. According to one Canadian study, less than 5 percent of 
tax filers in the lower half of the income distribution own CCPC shares versus 65-80 percent of 
tax filers in the top 0.1 percent of the income distribution.86 Another study documents the extent 
to which CCPCs have been used for income-splitting purposes, particularly by high-income 
professionals.87 For these reasons, it is not surprising that a prominent Canadian economist has 
84 Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, “Estimated costs of principal tax reliefs” available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/main-tax-expenditures-and-structural-reliefs. 
85 Canada, Department of Finance, Report on Federal Tax Expenditures – Concepts, Estimates and 
Evaluations 2019 (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 2019) at 29 [hereafter Canada, Report on Federal Tax 
Expenditures], available at https://www.fin.gc.ca/taxexp-depfisc/2019/taxexp-depfisc19-eng.pdf. 
86 Michael Wolfson, Mike Veall, Neil Brooks and Brian Murphy, “Piercing the Veil: Private Corporations 
and the Income of the Affluent” (2016), 64:1 Canadian Tax Journal 1-30. 
87 See, e.g., Michael Wolfson and Scott Legree, “Policy Forum: Private Companies, Professionals and 
Income-Splitting – Recent Canadian Experience” (2015), 63:3 Canadian Tax Journal 717-737. 
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reported that 60 percent of the tax benefit from the small business deduction goes to households 
with more than $150,000 in income.88 
Given these criticisms, it is perhaps surprising that several countries, including Canada 
and the United Kingdom, have provided preferential corporate tax rates for small business, and 
that these tax preferences have persisted over many years.89 As Professor Freedman’s co-
authored contribution to the Mirrlees Review notes, the explanation for this result is largely 
political, as the small business community is vocal, well-organized and broadly supported by the 
media and the general public, leading to “the introduction of reliefs which then become 
entrenched into the system and are hard to remove even if found unhelpful.”90 Nonetheless, this 
study continues, experience with the United Kingdom’s nil corporate tax rate in the early 2000s 
demonstrates that “business will broadly support simplifying measures where the reliefs have 
become very complex.”91 Indeed, it is testament to the influence of the Mirrlees Review’s 
recommendation that the general corporate rate should be aligned with the small business 
rate,92 that the United Kingdom eliminated the preferential rate for small business in 2015 by 
reducing the general corporate rate to the lower rate applicable to small business. In Canada, on 
the other hand, recent efforts to limit the use of private corporations for tax planning produced 
88 Jack Mintz, quoted in Bill Curry and Steven Chase, “Tories to table tax-cut-heavy federal budget plan”, 
Globe & Mail (April 21, 2015).  
89 For an excellent, though now somewhat dated, survey of small business taxation in Australia, Canada, 
the United Kingdom and the United States of America, see Neil Brooks, “Taxation of Closely-Held 
Corporations: The Partnership Option and the Lower Rate of Tax” (1986), 3:4 Australian Tax Forum 381-
509. 
90 Freedman and Crawford, “Small Business Taxation” supra note 2 at 1086. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. at 1066 and 1071. 
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a political backlash that ultimately led the federal government to actually increase the differential 
between the general corporate rate and the small business rate.93 
III. Canadian Experience with the Taxation of Private Companies and Their Shareholders
As noted earlier, Canada provides a preferential corporate tax rate for small business,
which is delivered in the form of a “small business deduction” that reduces the federal tax rate 
on the first $500,000 of active business income earned in a taxation year by a Canadian-
controlled private corporation (CCPC).94 It also maintains a preferential regime for capital gains, 
only half of which are subject to tax,95 and exempts over $800,000 of capital gains from the 
disposition of “qualified small business corporation shares” that are realized by resident 
individuals over the course of their lifetimes.96 
Together with other tax benefits resulting from incorporation, such as the ability to 
convert labour income in to capital income and the ability to split income more easily with related 
persons, these provisions create strong incentives for resident individuals to incorporate 
otherwise unincorporated enterprises, and for these shareholders to access corporate surpluses 
in the form of capital gains from the sale or liquidation of shares, rather than the distribution of 
dividends which are generally taxable at personal tax rates.97 Instead of pursuing the kinds of 
structural reforms that Professor Freedman advocates in order to reduce or eliminate these tax 
differentials, however, Canadian governments have relied on increasingly complicated statutory 
93 See the discussion at infra, text accompanying notes 134-138. 
94 ITA, supra note 12, s. 125. 
95 Ibid., s. 38, generally limiting the taxable amount of a capital gain and the allowable amount of a capital 
loss to one-half of the capital gain or loss. 
96 Ibid., s. 110.6(2.1). 
97 As explained more fully below, these dividends are subject to a gross-up and tax credit mechanism 
designed to integrate corporate and individual income taxes. Supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
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provisions and anti-avoidance rules in order to limit the scope of these tax preferences. The 
following sections review Canadian experience with the taxation of private companies and their 
shareholders, illustrating how Professor Freedman’s concerns have played out in the Canadian 
context. 
(1) Taxation of Private Companies 
The key elements of the small business deduction date from 1972, when the federal 
government replaced a two-tiered rate structure for all corporate income that had existed since 
1949.98 Although the Canadian Royal Commission on Taxation (Carter Commission) rejected 
arguments for a preferential small business rate in its 1967 Report,99 and the federal 
government’s 1969 White Paper recommended that that the dual rate structure should be 
abolished,100 political opposition led the government to replace the lower corporate rate with a 
tax credit that effectively reduces the federal corporate tax rate for qualifying income of eligible 
corporations.101 When first introduced in 1972, this credit reduced the corporate tax rate by 25 
percent from a general rate of 50 percent to a small business rate of 25 percent.102 With long-
term reductions in the corporate tax rates, however, this rate differential had decreased 
substantially by 2011, by which time the general federal corporate tax rate was 15 percent and 
the federal small business rate was 11 percent.103 
98 See Brooks, supra note 89 at 422-25. 
99 Canada, Royal Commission on Taxation, Report, vol. 4 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1967) at 270-73. 
100 Hon. E.J. Benson, Minister of Finance, Proposals for Tax Reform (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1969) at 27, 
paras. 4.15 to 4.18. 
101 See Brooks, supra note 89 at 434-37. 
102 Ibid. at 437. 
103 This rate differential is greatly increased, however, by provincial corporate income taxes, for which 
general corporate rates current range from 11 to 16 percent and small business rates range from 2 to 6 
percent. Although all provincial and territorial governments levy their own income taxes, provincial 
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In order to target the small business deduction to small businesses, the original provision 
included three features which remain to this day. First, the credit is available only to private 
corporations, not public corporations or corporations controlled by one or more public 
corporations – presumably since private corporations cannot raise capital by issuing shares to 
the public.104 Second, the credit is limited to a maximum amount of qualifying income for each 
taxation year (originally $50,000 but now $500,000), which must be shared among CCPCs that 
are “associated” with each other in the year.105 Finally, the credit applies only to the corporation’s 
income from an “active business carried on” by it in Canada so as to exclude its use to reduce the 
rate of tax on income from passive investments held by a private corporation.106 
In addition to these elements, the original legislation included two other features 
intended to target the incentive to new small businesses that would use the tax savings to invest 
in their businesses. First, in order to limit the incentive to new small businesses, the legislation 
included a “total business limit” that limited the maximum amount of qualifying income that 
could benefit from the credit to an aggregate amount.107 Second, in order to discourage 
qualifying corporations from using the tax savings to accumulate passive investments, the 
legislation included a special refundable tax on “ineligible investments” that effectively 
eliminated the benefit of the credit when a qualifying corporation made an investment that was 
income taxes are generally collected by the federal government under tax collection agreements whereby 
the provinces agree to adopt the same definition of taxable income as the federal income tax, while 
maintaining freedom to set their own rates. 
104 The credit is further limited to corporations that are not controlled by one or more non-residents in 
order to ensure that the benefit flows primarily to residents of Canada. ITA, supra note 12, s. 125(7) 
“Canadian-controlled private corporation”. 
105 Ibid., s. 125(2). 
106 Ibid., s. 125(1)(a). 
107 This aggregate limit was originally set at $400,000, but was increased to $500,000 in 1974, $750,000 in 
1976 and $1 million in 1982. Brooks, supra note 89 at 439.  
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not for the purpose of gaining or producing income from the business.108 Although these features 
arguably made the small business deduction a relatively well-designed tax subsidy,109 the 
refundable tax on ineligible investments was retroactively repealed in 1973 before it came into 
force,110 and the total business limit was repealed in 1985.111 
Judicial decisions further undercut the target-effectiveness of the subsidy by interpreting 
the (originally undefined) concept of an “active business” expansively to include most activities 
carried on by a corporation, including investment in income-producing property.112 Although the 
federal government responded to these decisions in 1979 by defining the concept of an “active 
business” to exclude a “specified investment business” the “principal purpose” of which is “to 
derive income (including interest, dividends, rents and royalties) from property,”113 this statutory 
test has been subject to considerable litigation in which courts must engage in a fact-based 
inquiry to determine whether the taxpayer’s core business activity involves the provision of 
property or the provision of services.114 This is also the case with an exclusion for a “personal 
108 Ibid., former Part V 
109 Brooks, supra note 89 at 441. 
110 S.C. 1973-74, c. 14, s. 60(1)(2). According to the Minister of Finance at this time, the refundable tax was 
not only complex but also unnecessary since “small corporations … will, in fact, use these tax savings to 
expand their businesses, to improve their technology and to create more jobs for Canadians.” Canada, 
House of Commons Debates, 19 February 1973, at 1433 (per Finance Minister, Hon J. Turner). 
111 S.C. 1984, c. 45, s. 40. 
112 See, e.g., The Queen v. Rockmore Investments Ltd., 76 D.T.C. 6156 (F.C.A), The Queen v. M.R.T. 
Investments Ltd., 76 D.T.C. 6158 (F.C.A.), and E.S.G. Holdings Ltd. v. The Queen, 76 D.T.C. 6158 (F.C.A.), in 
which interest income on mortgages held by the taxpayers was characterized as income from an active 
business; and The Queen v. Cadboro Bay Holdings Ltd., 77 D.T.C. 5115 (F.C.T.D.) at 5123, in which the court 
held that any quantum of business activity giving rise to income in a taxation year is sufficient for the 
income to be characterized as income from an active business.  
113 ITA, supra note 12, s. 125(7) “specified investment business”.  
114 See, e.g., 072443 B.C. Ltd. v. The Queen, [2015] 1 C.T.C. 2123, 2014 D.T.C. 1208 (T.C.C.), aff’d 2015 
D.T.C. 5115 (F.C.A.), in which the court determined that the principal purpose of a self-storage business 
was to derive income from the provision of rental space rather than the provisions of services. See also 
Rocco Gagliese Productions Inc. v. Canada, [2018] T.C.J. No. 102, [2019] 3 C.T.C. 2154, 2018 D.T.C. 1099 
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services business” which turns on whether an incorporated employee “would reasonably be 
regarded as an officer or employee of the person or partnership to whom or to which the services 
were provided but for the existence of the corporation”115 – thereby relying on the same fact-
based determinations that are used to distinguish employees from self-employed taxpayers.116 
Other elements of the small business deduction have also been subject to frequent 
litigation and recurring legislative amendments that increase complexity as well as compliance 
and administrative costs. Although the distinction between a private and a public corporation is 
easily drawn,117 the concept of corporate control is less clear and is often disputed.118 This is 
particularly the case with concept of de facto control, on which the statutory definition of a 
Canadian-controlled private corporation has relied since an amendment to this effect was added 
to the ITA in 1988.119 Following contradictory interpretations of this concept,120 moreover, the 
ITA was further amended in 2017 to require courts to “take into consideration all factors that are 
(T.C.C.), in which the court held that the taxpayer’s principal purpose was to earn income from composing 
music, notwithstanding that its main source of income was from royalties. 
115 ITA, supra note 12, s. 125(7) “personal services business”. This exclusion was originally introduced in 
1979 as one of various “non-qualifying businesses” (including professional corporations and management 
service corporations) that were eligible for a reduced credit. The reduced credit for personal services 
businesses was eliminated in 1981 and the exclusion for other non-qualifying businesses was eliminated 
in 1985. See Brooks, supra note 89 at 443-49. 
116 See, e.g., Dynamic Industries Ltd. v. Canada, [2005] 3 C.T.C. 225, 2005 D.T.C. 5293 (F.C.A.). 
117 See the definitions of “private corporation” and “public corporation” in ITA, supra note 12, s. 89(1). 
118 See, e.g., Duha Printers (Western) Ltd. v. Canada, [1998] 3 C.T.C. 303, 98 D.T.C. 6334 (S.C.C.); and Silicon 
Graphics Ltd. v. Canada, [2002] 3 C.T.C. 527, 2002 D.T.C. 7112 (F.C.A). 
119 ITA, supra note 12, s. 256(5.1), stipulating for the purposes of the ITA that a corporation is “controlled, 
directly or indirectly in any manner whatever” by a person or group of persons were “the controller has 
any direct or indirect influence that, if exercised, would result in control in fact of the corporation.”  
120 See, e.g., Transport M.L. Couture Inc. v. Canada, [2003] 3 C.T.C. 2882, 2003 D.T.C. 817 (T.C.C.), aff’d 
2004 D.T.C. 6636 (F.C.A.); and McGillivray Restaurant Ltd. v. Canada, [2015] 3 C.T.C. 2205, 2015 D.T.C. 
1030 (T.C.C.), aff’d [2017] 5 C.T.C. 103, 2016 D.T.C. 5048 (F.C.A.). 
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relevant in the circumstances” in determining de facto control,121 ensuring that the statutory test 
depends on a detailed fact-based inquiry.  
The concept of corporate control is also relevant to the associated corporation rules, 
which had accompanied the pre-1972 dual-rate corporate tax and were retained in order to 
prevent businesses from increasing the amount of income that is eligible for the credit by 
incorporating multiple entities.122 Subject to numerous deeming rules123 and a targeted anti-
avoidance rule enacted in 1988 which deems two or more corporations to be associated where 
“it may reasonably be considered that one of the main reasons for the separate existence of 
those corporations in a taxation year is to reduce the amount of taxes that would otherwise be 
payable”,124 these provisions have been a frequent topic of litigation.125 In order to further 
prevent multiplication of the small business deduction, moreover, recent amendments have 
introduced complicated rules that generally deny the small business deduction for income from 
the provision of services or property to a private corporation where the corporation, one of its 
shareholders, or a person who does not deal at arm’s length with the corporation or one of its 
shareholders, holds a direct or indirect interest in the private corporation to which the services 
or property are provided.126 Yet other amendments have aimed to better target the incentive to 
121 ITA, supra note 12, s. 256(5.11). 
122 Ibid. s. 256. 
123 See, e.g., the deemed control and share ownership rules in ibid., s. 256(1.2) to (1.4) and the deemed 
association rule for corporations associated with a third corporation in ibid., s. 256(2).  
124 Ibid., s. 256(2.1). 
125 See, e.g., Brownco Inc. v. Canada, [2008] 5 C.T.C. 2123, 2008 D.T.C. 2591 (T.C.C.); Taber Solids Control 
(1998) Ltd. v. Canada, [2010] 1 C.T.C. 2290, 2009 D.T.C. 1343 (T.C.C.); Maintenance Euréka Ltée v. Canada, 
2011 D.T.C. 1319 (T.C.C.); Jencal Holdings Ltd. v. Canada, 2019 D.T.C. 1019 (T.C.C.); and Prairielane 
Holdings Ltd. v. Canada, 2019 TCC 157 (T.C.C.). 
126 ITA, supra note 12, s. 125(1)(a) and 125(7) “specified corporate income” and “specified partnership 
income”. For a useful explanation of these rules, see Kenneth Keung, “New Small Business Deduction 
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small businesses by reducing the amount of income eligible for the deduction to the extent that 
the equity of the corporation and associated corporations exceeds $10 million,127 and to 
discourage the use of tax savings to accumulate passive investments by also reducing the amount 
of income eligible for the deduction to the extent that investment income of the corporation and 
associated corporations exceeds $50,000 annual and eliminating the deduction completely if 
annual income from passive investments reaches $150,000.128 
As explained earlier, the annual cost of the small business deduction in terms of foregone 
federal income tax revenue was $3.75 billion in 2016 and is projected to increase to $5.585 billion 
in 2019 – making it the second most costly tax expenditure after the partial taxation of capital 
gains.129 Evidence also suggests that the deduction provides the most benefit to high-income 
shareholders and family members who are able to obtain the greatest advantage from the 
deferral and income-splitting opportunities that are available when income is derived through 
private corporations.130 Finally, for the reasons that Professor Freedman has identified, a reduced 
rate for incorporated small businesses is a poorly-targeted tax incentive that greatly increases 
tax complexity for small businesses, as well as compliance and administrative costs.131 
For these reasons, Canada would be well-served to heed the advice of the Mirrlees 
Review and to follow the example of the United Kingdom by eliminating any differential between 
the general corporate tax rate and the small business rate. In fact, this possibility seemed 
Rules Under Section 125” in Report of the Proceedings of the Sixty-Eights Tax Conference, 2016 Conference 
Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2017), 27:1-26. 
127 ITA, supra note 12, s. 125(5.1)(a) [generally applicable to taxation years after June 1994]. 
128 ITA, supra note 12, s. 125(5.1)(b) [generally applicable to taxation years after 2018]. 
129 Canada, Report on Federal Tax Expenditures, supra note 85 at 29. 
130 Supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text. 
131 Supra, text accompanying notes 65-83. 
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tantalizingly close in 2015 when the differential in federal corporate tax rates was only 4 percent, 
and a new government was elected on a platform that promised to review all tax expenditures 
benefitting top income earners132 and (unlike the other two major political parties) did not 
promise to reduce the small business rate.133 Instead of addressing the rate differential directly, 
however, the government eventually proposed various measures to limit opportunities for tax 
planning using private corporations, including new provisions to discourage income-splitting 
through private corporations,134 a specific anti-avoidance rule to prevent the conversion of 
taxable dividends into tax-preferred capital gains,135 and other provisions to discourage the use 
of private corporations to accumulate passive investments.136 In the fact of fierce criticism from 
professionals and the small business sector, the government ultimately withdrew the specific 
anti-avoidance rule to prevent the conversion of dividends into capital gains, adopted a much 
weaker provision to discourage the use of private corporations to accumulate private 
132 Liberal Party of Canada, 2015 Election Platform, A New Plan for a Strong Middle Class (2015) at 73, 
available at https://www.liberal.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/New-plan-for-a-strong-middle-
class.pdf. 
133 Conservative Party of Canada, 2015 Election Platform, Protect our Economy (2015) at 19, available at 
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2454398/conservative-platform-2015.pdf; New Democratic 
Party of Canada, 2015 Election Platform, Building the country of our dreams (2015) at 15, available at 
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2454378/2015-ndp-platform-en.pdf. 
134 Department of Finance Canada, Tax Planning Using Private Corporations, supra note 19 at 18-31. 
135 Ibid. at 55-60. 
136 Ibid. at 32-54. 
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investments,137 and lowered the federal small business rate to 9 percent,138 thereby increasing 
the differential between this rate and the general corporate tax rate. 
(2) Taxation of Shareholders 
As Professor Freedman rightly notes, the extent to which a tax system encourages 
individuals to incorporate a small business is influenced not only by reduced rates for corporate 
income but also by the ability to convert labour income into lower-taxed income from capital and 
by the ability to split this income with related persons. Although Canada taxes dividends received 
by individual shareholders at personal tax rates, subject to a gross-up and tax credit regime 
designed to integrate corporate and individual income taxes,139 tax preferences for capital gains 
and the ability to split corporate income more easily than labour income create additional 
incentives to incorporate otherwise unincorporated businesses and an incentive for individual 
shareholders to convert otherwise taxable dividends into capital gains from the sale or liquidation 
of shares. As with the small business deduction, Canadian governments have relied on complex 
statutory provisions and anti-avoidance rules to limit the extent of these tax benefits, instead of 
pursuing structural reforms that would reduce or eliminate the tax differentials resulting from 
different kinds of income. 
137 ITA, supra note 12, s. 125(5.1)(b), which reduces the amount of income eligible for the small business 
deduction to the extent that investment income of the corporation and associated corporations exceeds 
$50,000 annually, eliminating the deduction completely when investment income is $150,000 per year – 
thereby allowing passive investments of $1 million with an assumed annual return of 5 percent without 
any reduction in the small business deduction and eliminating the small business deduction if passive 
investments with an assumed annual return of 5 percent are $3 million. 
138 S.C. 2018, c. 12, s. 20(1), amending ITA, supra note 12, s. 125(1.1).  
139 ITA, supra note 12, s. 82(1) and s. 121. Until 2005, this gross-up and credit system was designed to 
integrate corporate and individual income taxes only for corporate income subject to the small business 
deduction. Since then a separate gross-up and tax credit for “eligible dividends” integrates corporate and 
individual income taxes subject to tax at the general corporate rate. 
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(a) Dividends and Capital Gains 
Like the small business deduction, the gross-up and tax credit mechanism for dividends 
was introduced in 1972, at which time the general corporate tax rate in Canada was 50 percent, 
the small business deduction reduced this rate to 25 percent, and the gross-up and tax credit for 
individual shareholders offset corporate tax at the small business rate.140 Under this regime, 
individual shareholders subject to tax at a marginal rate of 50 percent paid an effective rate of 
331/3 percent on the cash amount of the dividends paid out of corporate income.141 Since one-
half of capital gains were taxable at the time, these rules created an incentive to realize corporate 
surplus in the form of capital gains, which would be taxable at effective rate of only 25% for 
individual shareholders subject to tax at a 50 percent marginal rate.142 
Because Canada did not tax capital gains before 1972, it had considerable experience with 
“surplus stripping” transactions designed to convert otherwise taxable dividends into non-
taxable capital gains, and had enacted various rules deeming proceeds from the sale or 
140 Brooks, supra note 89 at 437. 
141 Assuming $100 of corporate income subject to tax at the 25 percent small business rate, an individual 
shareholder taxable at a 50 percent marginal tax rate who received a dividend of $75 would gross-up the 
cash amount of the dividend by $25 (331/3 percent of $75), and receive a tax credit of $25 against tax 
otherwise payable of $50 (50 percent of $100), resulting in an effective rate of tax on the cash amount of 
the dividend of $25/$75 = 331/3 percent. If the corporate income were subject to the general rate of 50 
percent, the individual receiving a dividend of $50 would gross-up the cash amount of the dividend by 
$16.67 (331/3 percent of $50), and receive a tax credit of $16.67 against tax otherwise payable of $33.33 
(50 percent of $66.67), resulting in an effective rate of tax on the cash amount of the dividend of 
$16.67/$50 = 331/3 percent. 
142 Assuming that the value of a corporation is increased by the amount of after-tax income retained by 
the corporation, shareholders of a corporation earning $100 of income subject to tax at the 25 percent 
small business rate would realize a gain of $75 on the sale or liquidation of their shares, resulting in a 
taxable capital gain of $37.50 and tax of $18.75 (25% of the gain) for individuals subject to tax at a 50 
percent marginal rate.  
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liquidation of shares to be dividends in specific circumstances.143 While the taxation of capital 
gains reduced the incentive to engage in these transactions, the difference in effective tax rates 
on dividends and capital gains meant that these rules were retained in 1972.144 Although 
subsequent amendments in 1990 synchronized the effective rates on capital gain and dividends 
paid out of corporate income subject to the small business rate by reducing this rate to 20 percent 
and increasing the capital gains inclusion rate to three-quarters,145 this equivalence was not 
established for corporate income that was subject to the general corporate tax rate, and capital 
gains became generally more attractive than dividends after 2000 when the capital gains 
inclusion rate was reduced to one-half. 
In 1985, moreover, the federal government increased the incentive for surplus stripping 
by enacting a lifetime capital gains exemption that exempts a specific amount of capital gains 
143 See, e.g., s. 81(1) of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 148, which deemed funds or property distributed 
or appropriated in any manner whatever to or for the benefit of one or more shareholder on a winding-
up, discontinuance or reorganization of a corporation’s business to be a dividend to the extent of the 
corporation’s undistributed income on hand; ibid., s. 81(2) which deemed a dividend to have been 
received on the redemption of a share to the extent of the shareholder’s undistributed income on hand ; 
and ibid., s. 138A(1), which deemed  amounts received or receivable by a taxpayer as a consequence of a 
disposition or exchange of property to be a dividend where it could reasonably be considered that “one 
of the purposes” of the disposition or exchange was “to effect a significant reduction of, or disappearance 
of, assets of a corporation at any time in a manner such that the whole or any part of any tax that might 
otherwise have been or have become payable … in consequence of any distribution of property of a 
corporation has been or will be avoided.” For a useful discussion, see H. Heward Stikeman and Robert 
Couzin, “Surplus Stripping” (1995), 43:5 Canadian Tax Journal 1844-1860. 
144 ITA, supra note 12, s. 84(2), 84(3) and former 247(1) (which was repealed in 1988 when Canada’s 
general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) came into effect). 
145 Assuming $100 of corporate income subject to tax at the 20 percent small business rate, an individual 
shareholder taxable at a 50 percent marginal tax rate who received a dividend of $80 would gross-up the 
cash amount of the dividend by $25 (25 percent of $80), and receive a tax credit of $20 against tax 
otherwise payable of $50 (50 percent of $100), resulting in an effective rate of tax on the cash amount of 
the dividend of $30/$80 = 37.5 percent. Alternatively, if the after-tax income were retained by the 
corporation, resulting in a gain of $80 on a disposition of the shares, the shareholder would pay tax of $30 
(50 percent of $60, being three-quarters of the gain), also resulting in an effective tax rate of 37.5 percent. 
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realized by resident individuals over the course of their lifetimes.146 Although this exemption was 
capped in at $100,000 in 1987 and repealed in 1995, a more generous exemption for capital gains 
from the disposition of “qualified small business corporation” shares was introduced in 1988 and 
remains in place.147 Originally limited to $500,000, this amount was increased to $750,000 in 
2007 and $800,000 in 2014, when this amount was indexed for inflation, as a result of which the 
value of the exemption had increased to $866,912 in 2019. 
Extremely complicated,148 with multiple limitations,149 and a targeted anti-avoidance rule 
that disallows the exemption where among other things “it can reasonably be concluded, having 
regard to all the circumstances, that a significant part of the capital gain is attributable to the fact 
that dividends were not paid on a share,”150 the lifetime capital gains exemption was also 
accompanied by specific anti-avoidance rules aimed at surplus stripping through non-arm’s 
length transactions,151 and through the purchase by a public corporation of shares distributed in 
the form of a stock dividend.152 Although the anti-avoidance rule for public corporations has not 
resulted in any litigation, the anti-avoidance rule for non-arm’s length transactions has been 
subject to considerable litigation, which is not surprising for a provision that depends on the 
146 Ibid., s. 110.6(3) [repealed in 1995]. As originally enacted, the exemption was to be phased in from 
$20,000 in 1985 to $50,000 in 1986, $100,000 in 1987, $200,000 in 1988, $300,000 in 1989 and $500,000 
in 1990. 
147 Ibid., s. 110.6(2.1). 
148 See, e.g., the definition of “qualified small business corporation share” in ibid., s. 110.6(1), which 
includes ownership and asset requirements “at the determination time” and for 24 months preceding this 
time. 
149 See, e.g., the concept of a “cumulative gains limit” in ibid., s. 110.6(1), which reduces the amount that 
may be deducted under the exemption in a taxation year to the extent of the taxpayer’s “cumulative net 
investment loss” at the end of the year. 
150 Ibid., s. 110.6(8). Potentially quite broad, this provision is limited in scope by an exception for 
“prescribed shares”.  
151 Ibid., s. 84.1. 
152 Ibid., Part II.1. 
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factual determination of a non-arm’s length relationship between an individual who sells shares 
and a corporation that purchases the shares.153 The lifetime capital gains exemption has also 
been subject to numerous cases involving the Canadian general anti-avoidance rule, which was 
also enacted in 1988.154 
Consistent with Professor Freedman’s admonition, therefore, Canadian tax preferences 
for capital gains have been accompanied by complex statutory provisions that “attempt, often 
unsuccessfully, to confine the tax advantages to a subcategory”155 and by reliance on specific and 
general anti-avoidance rules to challenge tax-motivated arrangements to obtain tax benefits 
resulting from specific legal forms. In addition to their complexity, these tax preferences are 
extremely costly in terms of foregone revenues,156 uncertain in their economic impact,157 and 
disproportionately benefit high-income taxpayers.158 Here too, therefore, Canada would be well-
153 See, e.g., Brouillette v. Canada, [2005] 4 C.T.C. 2013, 2005 D.T.C. 1004 (T.C.C.); Côte –Létourneau v. 
Canada, 2007 TCC 91, 2010 D.T.C. 1116 (T.C.C.); and Poulin v. Canada, [2016] 6 C.T.C. 2206, 2016 D.T.C. 
1129 (T.C.C.). 
154 See, e.g., McNichol v. Canada, [1997] 2 C.T.C. 2088, 97 D.T.C. 111 (T.C.C.); Geransky v. Canada, [2001] 
2 C.T.C. 2147, 2001 D.T.C. 243 (T.C.C.); and McMullen v. Canada, [2007] 2 C.T.C. 2463, 2007 D.T.C. 286 
(T.C.C.). 
155 Freedman and Crawford, “Small Business Taxation” supra note 2 at 1061. 
156 Canada, Report on Federal Tax Expenditures, supra note 85 at 30 and 34, estimating the annual cost of 
the lifetime gains exemption in terms of foregone federal income tax revenue as $1.5 billion in 2016, 
which is projected to increase to $1.81 billion in 2019, and the annual cost of the partial inclusion of capital 
gains as $12.91 billion in 2016, which is projected to increase to $17.115 billion in 2019. 
157 See, e.g., Kenneth J. McKenzie and Aileen J. Thompson, “The Impact of the Capital Gains Exemption on 
Capital Markets” (1995), 21 Canadian Public Policy S100 at 2113, concluding that “[i]t is … difficult to draw 
strong conclusions about the effect of the capital gains exemption on the cost of capital, and, therefore, 
on investment.” 
158 David G. Duff, “Canada” in Michael Littlewood and Craig Elliffe, Capital Gains Taxation: A Comparative 
Analysis of Key Issues, (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017) 141 at 156-57 and 163, reporting 
that capital gains are constitute a much larger share of income reported by high-income taxpayers than 
middle- and low-income taxpayers and that the tax benefit from the lifetime capital gains exemption is 
enjoyed overwhelmingly by high-income taxpayers. 
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served to heed Professor Freedman’s advice to reduce or eliminate the tax differentials resulting 
from these tax preferences. 
(b) Income-Splitting 
The incentive to incorporate a small business for tax reasons is also driven by 
opportunities to split income with related persons. Although Canada has a lengthy history with 
attribution rules that limit opportunities to split income with spouses and related minors through 
transfers of property for consideration less than fair market value,159 and the revenue authorities 
have successfully relied on a provision limiting deductions to amounts that are “reasonable in the 
circumstances”160 in order disallow the deduction of excessive salaries paid to related 
employees,161 opportunities to split income through private corporations were greatly facilitated 
by a 1998 Supreme Court of Canada decision allowing the diversion of corporate income to the 
taxpayer’s spouse through a separate class of shares on which dividends could be paid at the 
discretion of the company’s directors.162 
Although the government of the day responded to this decision with a provision taxing 
most private company dividends received by individuals under age 18 at the top marginal rate,163 
this tax on split income (TOSI) did little to discourage the tax-motivated incorporation of small 
businesses since it did not apply to spouses or adult children. Indeed, in the fifteen years after 
the TOSI came into effect in 2000, the number of Canadian-controlled private corporations 
159 For the current version of these rules, see ITA, supra note 12, s. 74.1 to 74.5. 
160 Ibid., s. 67. 
161 See, e.g., Grant Babcock Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue, [1985] 2 C.T.C. 2181, 85 D.T.C. 518 
(T.C.C.); and Maduke Foods Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue, [1989] 2 C.T.C 284, 89 D.T.C. 5458 
(F.C.T.D.). 
162 Neuman, supra note 38.  
163 ITA, supra note 12, s. 120.4. 
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increased by 50 percent, the number of incorporated self-employed individuals doubled, and the 
number of professional services corporations tripled.164 
When the government returned to this issue in 2017, it did not – as Professor Freedman 
would have suggested – address the problem of income-splitting “in a holistic way” considering 
both the conversion of labour income into capital income and “the rules on family taxation … and 
capital transfers between spouses,”165 but instead proposed to extend the TOSI rules to include 
all resident individuals receiving dividends or capital gains from the disposition of shares of a 
private corporation over which a “connected individual” exercises significant influence.166 After 
considerable controversy and opposition from professionals and the small business sector, a 
substantially revised and considerably more complex version of these rules was enacted effective 
for the 2018 taxation year.167 Here again, therefore, Canada would have been better served if it 
had heeded Professor Freedman’s advice. 
IV. Conclusion
Over the course of a distinguished academic career, Judith Freedman has consistently and
persuasively argued that the taxation of similar economic activities carried on through different 
legal forms is best addressed by reducing or eliminating the tax differentials among these legal 
forms, instead of through complicated statutory provisions and anti-avoidance rules that attempt 
to confine the tax advantages associated with particular legal forms to subcategories of these 
164 Department of Finance Canada, Tax Planning Using Private Corporations, supra note 19 at 11. 
165 Freedman, “Taxing the Micro-Business” supra note 2 at 74. 
166 Ibid. at 18-31. 
167 S.C. 2018, c. 12, s. 13(5) to (7), amending ITA, supra note 12, s. 120.4. 
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forms. For this and other reasons, she has also questioned special tax preferences for small 
business, particularly through a reduced corporate tax rate for small business. 
Canadian experience with the taxation of private companies and their shareholders 
illustrates why Professor Freedman’s contributions to tax law and policy regarding small business 
are so convincing. Instead of minimizing tax differentials among different legal forms, Canada 
provides a preferential tax rate for small businesses and tax preferences for capital gains, which 
encourage the tax-motivated incorporation of otherwise unincorporated businesses, the 
conversion of labour income into capital income and dividend income into capital gains, and 
income-splitting with related persons. In order to limit the scope of these tax preferences, 
moreover, Canada relies on complicated statutory provisions which are subject to frequent 
amendment as well as specific and general anti-avoidance rules to challenge perceived abuses. 
The result is a complex and often uncertain legislative framework the economic merits of which 
are doubtful, the tax advantages of which are enjoyed disproportionately by high income 
taxpayers, and the cost of which in terms of foregone revenues and increased compliance and 
administrative costs are substantial. 
As Professor Freedman notes, the reason why these kinds of tax preferences persist had 
more to do with politics than policy, since the small business community is vocal, well-organized 
and broadly supported by the media and the general public.168 At the same time, experience in 
the U.K. suggests that business may support simplifying reforms when tax rules become 
extremely complex, 169 and that it is possible to align corporate tax rates for small and large 
168 Freedman and Crawford, “Small Business Taxation” supra note 2 at 1086. 
169 Ibid. 
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business – though it is important to note that this result was accomplished by reducing the 
general corporate rate to the small business rate instead of by increasing the small business rate, 
which would have been much more challenging politically. 
Most importantly, perhaps, experience in the U.K. suggests that thoughtful tax policy 
analysis, particularly when provided through an expert and impartial medium like the Mirrlees 
Review, can have a positive impact on actual tax policy. Indeed, Professor Freedman’s 
contributions to tax law and policy regarding small business are testament to her conviction that 
“in the long run a clear policy based system that can be explained to taxpayers and shown to be 
equitable and simple to operate may be more successful politically than one which responds to 
lobbyists and creates complexity, resulting in anti-avoidance provisions and confusion amongst 
users about the objectives of the system.”170 
170 Ibid. 
